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Disrupting gifted teenager’s mathematical identity with epistemological 
messiness 
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Laura McMaster, Miles Macdonell Collegiate, Canada 
 
Abstract.  Mathematics is widely perceived as a universal and uncontested discipline, 
contrary to the philosophy of mathematics literature.  Other researchers have considered 
the potential role of philosophy in school, but there is little work with gifted students 
engaged with issues concerning the nature of mathematics.   We developed a philosophy 
of mathematics unit intended to enlarge gifted students’ perceptions of the nature of 
mathematics by exposing the uncritical and tidy rendering of mathematics within school 
math.  Using a narrative methodology, we attended to gifted student’s students’ stories of 
relationship with mathematics, based on the premise that a person’s relationship with 
mathematics is inextricably woven together with their identity.  In this paper, we will 
focus on the experiences of three gifted teenagers during our philosophy of mathematics 
unit.  We found that these students were disrupted and compartmentalized their school 
math and philosophy of mathematics experiences and beliefs.  We conclude that 
substantive experiences with the nature of mathematics should be a regular component of 
school math. 
 
Key words: philosophy of mathematics, gifted high school students, mathematical 
identity, narrative 
INTRODUCTION 
For me, yeah I don’t like it – grayness in math.  I think of math as right or wrong 
(Dorothy, a high school student in the IB program). 
 
It is well known that mathematics is perceived as a universal and unquestioned 
body of knowledge.  This positioning of the nature of mathematics in wider society is 
reflected in curricular documents and in the teaching of mathematics.  Curriculum 
recommendations do not, to our knowledge, ever refer to possible philosophically-based 
goals or learning outcomes (see, for example, National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics, 2000; Western and Northern Canadian Protocol, 2006; Manitoba 
Education, 2008).  Teachers, en masse, believe that mathematics is absolute (at a 
superficial level), and reproduce these beliefs among their students (Philipp, 2007). 
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Contrary to the popular positioning of mathematics in school math and the wider 
society, philosophers have debated the epistemological status of mathematics at least as 
far back as Socrates.  These debates revolve around the questioning of mathematics as an 
absolute body of knowledge and are far from resolved.  Various fallibilist positions have 
been developed by mathematicians (e.g., Davis & Hersh, 1981), mathematics educators 
(e.g., Ernest, 1998), philosophers (e.g., Lakatos, 1976), and cognitive scientists (e.g., 
George Lakoff & Nunez, 2000). 
Given the premise that school math is presented as a neat, tidy and undisputable 
collection of facts, we developed a “messy” conception of the nature of mathematics, and 
then developed activities intended to explore this messiness with gifted teenagers.  Our 
goal was to use messiness to expand gifted high school students’ conceptions of the 
nature of mathematics.  Not surprisingly, given many years of exposure to a narrow and 
tidy vision of mathematics in school, the gifted students we worked with struggled to 
make sense of mathematics as messy. 
Philosophy based programs of study for children and young adults are not a new 
idea.  For example, the Philosophy for Children (P4C) program was initiated in the 
seventies by Lipman, premised by the idea that children and young adults can think 
philosophically, and so philosophy should not be relegated to college-level study 
(Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1980).  These programs also tend to share the following 
qualities: (1) pedagogy is rooted in open dialogue, where a context, such as a story (e.g., 
Lipman, 1988;), or a story beginning (e.g., Matthews, 1984) is used to trigger a teacher-
facilitated discussion of a philosophical issue; and (2) content is usually focused on 
general philosophical issues such morals, ethics, truth, and rarely considers discipline-
based issues.  The effects of these programs have been well documented.  In general, 
these programs improve the thinking (e.g., Naji & Ghazinezhad, 2008) and other 
curriculum-based skills of students (e.g., Trickey & Topping, 2004). 
Specific issues arise when considering exposing children and young adults to 
ideas from the philosophy of mathematics.  Given that mathematics is perceived as 
(superficially) absolute within school math and by the wider society, what is there to 
discuss philosophically?  Daniel et.al. used the P4C model to develop a philosophy of 
mathematics program (called P4CM) for children and young adults (Daniel, Lafortune, 
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Pallascio, & Schleifer, 1999).  Stories with mathematical content were used to trigger 
open dialogue concerning philosophy of mathematics.  They found various kinds of 
evidence that participation in P4CM is beneficial; for example, negative attitudes toward 
mathematics are reduced (Lafortune, Daniel, Pallascio, & Schleifer, 1999).  Others have 
successfully implemented variations on P4CM.  For example, while working with junior 
high students, Martin (2008) used a story that raises the issue of making a perfect cube to 
trigger a conversation about whether a perfect cube actually exists; the ideas within the 
conversation of these students were consistent with ontological views of Aristotle and 
Plato. 
 For all of these philosophical programs, questions remain concerning the process 
of students’ development of enhanced thinking.  In particular, while participating in open 
philosophical dialogue, students would be individually making sense of philosophical 
issues.  There would likely be changes in their informal, implicit personal philosophies.  
What sorts of changes might occur and how do they occur?  These questions apply 
equally to gifted and the general student population.  In particular, it is not clear in what 
ways gifted students would respond to a unit of activities focusing on issues concerning 
the philosophy of mathematics.  For example, we found various positioning of gifted 
students toward a philosophy of mathematics unit, including confusion, resistance and 
engagement (McMaster & Betts, 2007). 
We wondered if the gifted students we work with would be more or less open to 
entertaining alternative visions of mathematics.  Would they be responsive?  Would their 
gifted abilities contribute to or hinder their responsiveness?  We considered this research 
to be a first foray into these questions, and therefore deliberately decided to take an 
exploratory approach.  Because we hoped to expand students’ perspectives of 
mathematics, because we believed gifted students would be able to handle ideas that 
would appear foreign to their past experiences with mathematics, and because our 
activities come near the end of a course on philosophy, we did not expect to be disruptive 
of their relationship with mathematics.  Our efforts disrupted student relationships with 
mathematics, but it is unclear whether their perspectives were enlarged in a stable way.  
In this paper, we will look closely at how three gifted students adapted to the disruptions 
triggered by a “messy” rendering of the nature of mathematics.  We will suggest that 
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these students navigated the disruption by compartmentalizing their experiences, which 
likely allowed them to protect their identities in relation to mathematics. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
In this research project, our goal was to expand our IB student’s appreciation of 
mathematics.  To detect this goal, we used a narrative methodology (Clandinin & 
Connelly, 2000) – we sought to detect student’s stories of identity in relation to 
mathematics.  Narrative assumes that we use story to make sense of experience and that 
experience is storied (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).  Hence, we looked for student stories 
that suggested how they were positioning themselves in relation to the ideas presented 
during our philosophy of mathematics unit. 
A narrative approach is suitable to the nature of our research questions.  This 
paper represents results from an initial project concerning gifted student’s positioning of 
self and others that are triggered by experiences with the nature of mathematics.  We are 
less concerned with what students know or learned about mathematics or the nature of 
mathematics.  Rather, we sought to understand the role of their identities (as learners and 
gifted students) as they struggled with novel ideas concerning the nature of mathematics.  
Our focus is on experience and identity; hence the uses of a narrative approach. In what 
follows, we describe the participants and their context for this study, methods of data 
collection and analysis, and our philosophy of mathematics unit based on epistemological 
messiness. 
Participants and context 
The students we worked with were enrolled full time in the International 
Baccalaureate (IB) program, and in their final year of high school.  We consider these 
students to be gifted because they are high performing academically and highly motivated 
to be successful. The IB program is a “demanding two-year curriculum that meets the 
needs of highly motivated students” (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2005-
2009c), and so it is considered an advanced placement program of study, attracting 
students with the highest grades in regular studies.  At the very least, all the students were 
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academically precocious, based on grades.  The three students we focus on in this paper 
are among the best in the IB program at this school.  Dorothy is a multi-sport athlete with 
high marks in all subjects, and scored in the top 15% in English among all IB programs in 
the world.  Mary consistently receives the highest grades in all subjects among all 
students in the IB program in her school.  John scores high marks in all courses, and is 
considered brilliant in math and science by his teachers. 
 The IB program is implemented by high schools around the world, all following 
an academically advanced and standardized curriculum (International Baccalaureate 
Organization, 2005-2009b).  The IB curriculum includes a course called Theory of 
Knowledge (ToK), which focuses on ways of knowing, including epistemological issues 
specific to major disciplines (International Baccalaureate Organization, 2005-2009a).  
The philosophy of math unit within ToK is an ideal location to introduce the notion of 
epistemological messiness.  All students who participated in this project were enrolled in 
the Theory of Knowledge course, as well as other IB courses that would be considered 
advanced versions of standard high school courses, such as Math, Science, and English.  
The philosophy of mathematics unit came near the end of the ToK course, so general 
ideas (e.g., Plato’s Forms, aesthetics) where available to apply to the particular case of the 
discipline of mathematics. 
Data collection and analysis 
 Stories of student identity in relation to mathematics were constructed from data 
collected before, during and after the philosophy of mathematics unit.  Before beginning 
the unit, we interviewed each participant, seeking to establish their appreciation of and 
attitudes about mathematics.  These interviews revealed what we expected: mathematics 
is absolute and so why would there be a need to consider philosophical aspects of 
mathematics.  Thus, we knew at the start of the unit that students would tend to story the 
experience with narratives such as “math is inaccessible” and “math is black and white.”  
We speculated that these stories would be intimately tied to how they made sense of 
ideas.  For example, Plato’s Forms may prop up a student’s identity of “yes, math is 
inaccessible.”  We also suspected that students would need to negotiate tensions between 
ideas developed during the unit and their life of experiences with mathematics dominated 
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by just one vision of mathematics, namely, math is a perfect and uncontested body of 
knowledge. 
 During the unit, we asked students to write a reflective journal at the end of each 
class.  These served a pedagogical purpose: they provided us with insight on student 
thinking for assessment purposes, allowed us to provide feedback to students for the 
purpose of encouraging further elaboration of their ideas, and were used to showcase 
student ideas in subsequent classes.  The journals were also used for research purposes.  
They became a source of data for detecting student’s stories of identity in relation to 
mathematics. We also kept field notes of interesting conversations that occurred during 
the classes, which also served as a source of data. 
 After the unit was complete, we selected ten students to participate in an in-depth 
interview.  We used two criteria to select candidates.  First, we sought candidates that 
seemed to display exceptional giftedness.  Although this tended to correlate with grades, 
we looked for students who displayed exceptional thinking during classes, such as an 
ability to develop an idea or the soundness of their ideas.  Second, based on the journals 
and field notes, we tried to select candidates with differing reactions toward the unit.  For 
example, John aggressively accepted Formalism throughout although began to consider 
Embodiment at the end of the unit, whereas Mary quietly embraced Platonism 
throughout, whereas Dorothy seemed undecided throughout but tentatively considered 
Proofs and Refutations (see next subsection for descriptions of these philosophical 
positions).  The final interview lasted about an hour, was open ended, and focused on 
encouraging and challenging students to describe and develop their views concerning the 
nature of mathematics. 
 We decided to describe the stories of three students, Dorothy, Mary and John.  We 
believe that each of these students are quite different, and taken as a whole are reflective 
of the diversity of the class.  They are also among the most gifted of the students who 
participated.  And yet, despite the diversity suggestive of our small sample, we found a 
common theme in their stories, namely, a navigation of disruption of their identity in 
relation to mathematics.  In the next sections, we will try to illustrate these stories of 
navigation of disruption. 
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 Data analysis proceeded in two phases.  First, we focused solely on developing 
the story of each of the three students (and the other students who participated in the post-
interview), without comparison.  We each developed a story and then, through a process 
of dialogue and reexamination of the data, we came to an agreement on each story.  Our 
differing perspectives as regular-teacher-of-these-students and researcher-from-outside-
the school were complementary, and, we believe, adds to the trustworthiness of our 
interpretations.  From these stories, we selected three for further analysis.  We then 
looked for themes across the stories of the three case participants.  It was during this 
second phase that we came to agree on the theme of disruption, and when we began 
orienting their stories as one of navigating disruption. 
An epistemologically messy philosophy of mathematics unit 
Numerous mathematicians have described the work they do using journey or 
process metaphors, which belie the neat and tidy presentations of mathematics found in 
most expository texts, including school math text books.  For example, 
When asked what it was like to set about proving something, the mathematician 
likened proving a theorem to seeing the peak of a mountain and trying to climb to 
the top.  One establishes a base camp and begins scaling the mountain's sheer 
face, encountering obstacles at every turn, often retracing one's steps and 
struggling every foot of the journey.  Finally when the top is reached, one stands 
examining the peak, taking in the view of the surrounding countryside and then 
noting the automobile road up the other side! (Kleinhenz, 2007) 
What is described in math textbooks and taught in school math classes is the “automobile 
road up the other side,” which clearly hides most of what it means to do math.  And yet, if 
students are to appreciate math (a goal found in all curriculum documents we are aware 
of!), then they should experience the doing of mathematics.  The quote above begins to 
question a tidy rendering of doing mathematics – there are frustrations, false starts, back 
tracking, and numerous other accomplishments and setbacks along the way.  At the very 
least, problem solving is more than a linear sequence of steps, and there is always more to 
do even after a problem is solved.  This is a starting point for recognizing that school 
math experiences hide philosophical issues.  It is with this rejection of the tidiness in the 
representations of school math that we use as a starting point for the nature of 
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mathematics as messy.        
 We wish to be critical of a tidy vision of the nature of mathematics that seems to 
be universally propagated by school math.  Mathematics as a perfect and uncontested 
body of knowledge is a tidy position – there is no uncertainty and hence no messiness.  
But numerous philosophers have questioned the certainty of mathematics.  For example, 
Davis and Hersh (1981), who are mathematicians, suggest that mathematics is a human 
endeavor, and hence subject to the same fallibilism as any human endeavor.  Ernest 
(1998) developed a fallibilist position by drawing on a social constructivist perspective.  
Although school math does not explicitly present a philosophy of mathematics, its tidy 
enactment commonly engenders superficial absolutist positions among student’s personal 
working philosophies.         
 We developed a philosophy of math unit based on exploring four distinct 
philosophical positions concerning the discipline of mathematics.  Each of these positions 
were given credence as viable philosophies, where deeper explorations of each were 
intended to invite students to attend to and critique the tidy renditions of school math 
common to their mathematical experiences.  First, we broadly distinguish between 
Absolutism (math is universal and infallible) and Humanism (math is fallible).  We then 
developed two example positions for each broad category: Platonism and Formalism for 
Absolutism, and Proofs and Refutations and Embodiment for Humanism.   
 We gradually developed each of these positions through a series of activities, each 
activity usually built from a specific high school math context but examined from a 
philosophical perspective and with minimal attention to teaching the mathematics 
involved (we ensured that the mathematical concepts explored were familiar to students).  
A messy rendition for the nature of mathematics emerges in two ways:  each 
philosophical position by itself carries numerous opportunities for critique of the neatness 
of school math, and the availability of multiple positions for the nature of mathematics is 
an opportunity to perceive the philosophy of mathematics as a contested body of 
knowledge.  In what follows, we provide a brief description of each position, and of one 
example activity, to illustrate the content of our philosophy of mathematics unit [see Betts 
(2007) and McMaster & Betts (2007) for more detailed descriptions of our philosophy of 
mathematics unit]. 
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 Platonism is an absolutist position based on Plato’s “allegory of the cave” and 
Plato’s “Forms” (Govier, 1997).  Forms are the ideal – a universal representation of the 
particulars accessible to humans.  The cave allegory suggests that humans perceive only 
shadows of perfection – being the Forms – and are chained down, unable to be free of the 
cave to experience perfection.  So, in particular, mathematical concepts, such as the 
fraction ½ and a drawing of a line, are but imperfect representations of the Form for a 
concept.  School math pretends to present ideas as if they are ideal.  A line is drawn as if 
it is a “perfect” line, rather than as a representation of a line that is good enough for the 
purposes of the current mathematical argument.  Platonism can trigger critique of the 
neatness of school math because humans cannot access the ideal – the Forms – and hence 
must account for the imperfection of a human representation of a mathematical idea.  
Erdos, one of the most prolific mathematicians ever, was a proponent of Platonism 
(Hersh, 1997).   
Formalism is also an Absolutist position, and is based on the premise that error 
enters into mathematics when its ideas are operationalized in human contexts (Hersh, 
1997).  For example, Russell’s paradox arises because it is represented using language, 
and so is subject to the fallibility of language.  Mathematicians such as Hilbert set out to 
formalize mathematics as a symbolic system independent of language (Mancosu, 1998).  
In essence, mathematics is a set of symbols and rules for manipulating these symbols, 
which have no meaning in the real world.  According to the mathematician Hardy, only 
pure mathematics, mathematics that is unconcerned with application in the real world, is 
real mathematics (Hardy, 1992).  Students can engage with the idea that mathematics 
does not come in a perfect package; rather, mathematicians have worked hard to remove 
error from mathematics.  Hardy would argue that school math is not real mathematics, 
which can lead students to question the tidy renditions of school math as misleading. 
 One of the Humanist positions is based solely on the ideas developed by Lakatos 
in his book Proofs and Refutations. Lakatos used the historical development of Euler’s 
formula to describe various iterations of the following process: conjecture, proof of 
conjecture, refutation of conjecture (e.g., by counter example; critique of proof, 
definitions, and/or axioms), leading to a new conjecture (by modifying definitions, 
axioms, and/or the actual conjecture) (Lakatos, 1976).  This position is messy in two 
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ways.  First, a result is sanctioned by the mathematical community not just by proof, but 
by a process of error detection and adjustment to account for the error.  Mathematical 
decisions can be based on criteria other than logic, such as aesthetics.  Second, a theorem 
can always come under scrutiny, even if it has been sanctioned as true by the mathematics 
community – in other words, we can never be 100% sure that a conjecture and its proof is 
true because another refutation may arise in the future.     
 The other humanist position, which we call Embodiment, is based on the ideas of 
Lakoff and Nunez.  The reader should consult other writers for more detailed descriptions 
of embodied cognition in general (e.g., G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) and as it relates to 
mathematics (e.g., George Lakoff & Nunez, 2000).  A key principle is that mathematical 
ideas start from our experience as humans and are built up via a series of metaphorical 
mappings.  For example, the notion of continuity of the real number line comes from our 
embodied experience of motion.  The real numbers is a discrete and infinite collection of 
numbers, but is also represented as a continuous line.  We can manage these realizations 
of real numbers because we can experience continuous motion between two points, 
which is also a travelling of an infinite number of discrete points (e.g., the halfway point).  
The embodied experience of motion from A to B is metaphorically mapped onto the 
notion of an interval of the real number line, such as all real numbers from 0 to 1.  An 
embodied vision of mathematics is messy because the idea that mathematics is universal 
and independent of humanity is completely rejected. 
 One of the activities we used near the beginning of the unit involved the circle.  
We asked the students to come up with more than one answer to the following question, 
and to be able to justify their answers:  How many sides does a circle have?  We know of 
5 distinct and mathematically viable answers to this question, of which, we will describe 
three: (1) no sides because sides are straight and a circle is curved; (2) one side, which is 
the edge going all the way around the circle; and (3) infinitely many, because a circle is 
the limiting case of a regular n-sided shape as n approaches infinity (in the limit, there is 
an infinite number of sides, each of length 0).  After generating a list of answers that 
seemed mathematically correct and trying to justify which answer could/should be the 
correct answer, we asked students to reflect and discuss what this situation means for the 
nature of mathematics. 
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 This activity allowed us to develop several philosophical issues, based on the 
ideas of students.  If, for example, we pick one answer, how do we know for certain it is 
correct, which allows us to point to a broad distinction between Absolutism and 
Humanism.  The distinction arises because of the potential for opting for an answer that 
later turns out to be rejected – does this mean that mathematicians can eventually remove 
all error with careful analysis, or is mathematics a human endeavor so that it must be a 
fallible body of knowledge.  Another issue arises concerning the inaccuracy that must 
arise in drawing a circle, which leads to the idea of a perfect circle and Plato’s Forms.  
Finally, in the debate about which answers to accept, the issue of agreeing on the 
definition of a side arises, leading to a discussion of Lakatos’ heuristic, where we 
consider the refutation of an idea through the contesting of a definition. 
 The circle activity is not immediately used to illustrate Embodiment.  The 
Embodied position is difficult to develop because it is based on attending to subtle and 
taken-for-granted aspects of human experience.  After an initial encounter with 
Embodiment that is not grounded in a mathematical context, we revisit previous 
examples for evidence of this position.  For the circle example above, we wonder how to 
imagine how n-sided shapes of increasing n approach a circle but the circle doesn’t 
disappear in the limiting case.  How do we do this?  We can’t draw a circle as an infinite 
number of sides of length zero.  But we can experience a circle as a continuous curving 
line that loops back onto itself, which is metaphorically mapped onto the limiting case 
definition of circle. 
 The example above also illustrates the pedagogical principles used to implement 
our philosophy of mathematics unit.  We followed teaching ideas used in the P4C model.  
In particular, we sought to establish an environment where open dialogue concerning the 
nature of mathematics was facilitated.  We encouraged students to state and defend 
philosophical positions.  We resisted the urge to tell students about the philosophical 
positions of others or to suggest a “best” position.  We considered it tantamount that 
students not consider us, as teachers, to be the final arbiters of a correct philosophical 
position or argument.  Rather, we sought opportunities to validate student thinking by 
labeling their ideas as following a specific philosophical position.  So, for example, when 
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a student argued that the circle example above suggests that mathematical results change 
over time, we suggested that their position was similar to that of Lakatos.    
Students were encouraged to and did begin to develop their own personal 
philosophical positions concerning the nature of mathematics, rather than merely 
reproducing ideas from us.  Our pedagogical emphasis on dialogue and refusal to 
sanction one philosophical position as correct led students to think deeply about the 
philosophical implications of the mathematical contexts we explored and about their own 
experiences with mathematics.  Students had no difficulty applying to the case of 
mathematics ideas previously developed in their philosophy course.  We noticed students 
suggesting that aesthetics is an important consideration, leading to an interrogation of 
proof as the only arbiter of mathematical truth.  Students also were able to critique 
mathematical aspects of the contexts we presented.  The idea that we must decide on the 
meaning of a side during the circle activity above was brought forward by the students 
without prompting from us.  With some scaffolding we were able to help students notice 
superficial uses of Humanism and Absolutism.  They, for example, began to recognize 
that falliblism is not the same as solipsism.  Most significantly was the critical thinking 
inherent in the questioning of students:  How do we gain knowledge of the Forms if we 
can only access the imperfect – if we are trapped in the cave?  Why isn’t it possible for 
mathematical results to be certain even though they emerge from human experience?  
These questions respectively represent a critique of Platonism and a synthesis of 
Absolutism and Embodiment.  The students, in general, did engage with philosophical 
ideas, critique the neatness of school math, and begin to appreciate the philosophy of 
mathematics as a contested body of knowledge [see McMaster & Betts (2007) for further 
details].  
RESULTS - DESCRIBING EACH STUDENT’S STORY OF NAVIGATING 
DISRUPTION 
 Our focus in this paper is not what students learned.  We saw significant evidence 
that the students engaged with philosophical ideas, and take it as a given that they learned 
about philosophies of mathematics.  Our focus on student identity leads us to notice how 
their thinking about the nature of mathematics was intricately woven together with their 
relationship with mathematics and their identity in general.  Philosophical ideas 
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concerning the nature of mathematics are not evident within these students’ prior 
experience, but their identities do matter as they take-in and work with these ideas, 
independent of their common experiences of math as a neat collection of facts and rules 
to follow.  We found that many student’s identities in relation to mathematics were 
disrupted.  In previous work, we developed a general description and characterization of 
the disruption for all students who participated in our philosophy of mathematics unit 
(see McMaster & Betts, 2007).  In this paper, we focus on a deeper description of how 
three students navigated the disruption of their identity in relation to mathematics.  Each 
student started the unit believing mathematics was tidy and uncontested, and this belief 
was implicitly challenged by the activities during the unit.  For each case, we try to 
establish a chronology for each story, based on their identity before the philosophy of 
math unit (as per pre-interview), during the unit (journals and in-class observations), and 
after the unit (as per post-interview). 
DOROTHY 
Before the philosophy of mathematics unit began, Dorothy expressed a joy for 
learning in general and math in particular.  She expressed a real satisfaction in obtaining 
the right answer in math, which is a feeling that she has valued since early elementary 
school.  She prefers certain branches of math, such as algebra and trigonometry, over 
others such as probability, because she doesn’t like having what she calls “options” in 
probability.  She also likes the process of working through a precise sequence of steps, 
where that process is clear and linear, a process she describes as “exactly how things fall 
into place.”  She wants to know how it works, but only wants it to work in one way.  One 
right answer is what she wants.  At the conclusion of this pre-interview, she states, though 
not rudely, that she just wants to “stop talking about math.”  Dorothy is interested only in 
the business of doing math that involves arriving at the right answer, and finds it 
uncomfortable and disconcerting to delve into the philosophical issues that accompany it.  
Dorothy carries a tidy rendering of the nature of mathematics:  results are either right or 
wrong, there is one method for solving each problem, and each method is essentially an 
algorithm.  Dorothy’s implicit personal philosophy of mathematics is a superficial form 
of absolutism, propped up by her success with doing school math. 
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During the philosophy of mathematics unit, Dorothy freely expresses feelings of 
confusion.  She is clearly not comfortable with this feeling, and tends to seek simplistic 
resolutions to the issues presented in class.  For example, in an early journal she wrote:  
“It is just simpler to accept what we are told than to dispute it.”  She does not want to 
enter this debate at all, but since she is required to, she advocates for math that is simple 
and useful.  In a later journal, she agrees with the Humanist position because it is simple, 
not just from a mathematical point of view, but from a human point of view.  She wrote:  
“We must make adjustments to mathematical concepts for sheer simplicity in life.”  She 
objects to discussing the issues.  This discussion frustrates her because she does not see 
its purpose.  We believe this is because she has been indoctrinated to be very goal 
oriented, rather than to see the value of the messy discussion that we undertook in class. 
After the philosophy of math unit, Dorothy was still reluctant to talk about the 
nature of math, and seeks to keep issues of messiness in math from threatening her prior 
experiences with a right/wrong dichotomy approach to math that she has been trained to 
value.  She is willing to discuss various elements of math as long as those discussions do 
not threaten what she sees as math’s fundamental operations, such as how formulas work, 
or whether they work.  She is so comfortable with the right/wrong approach to math that 
she is only willing to discuss the issues underpinning math if she can consider them like 
separate issues that don’t threaten what she feels she actually does in math class - 
different philosophical positions can call different issues into question but that doesn’t 
mean that there is more than one answer to problems she is asked to solve in math class.  
Dorothy seems to be able to compartmentalize math to make these discussions feel safe 
to her; that is, we can talk about the philosophy of math as long as it doesn’t prevent her 
from being able to seek the right answer to a math problem.   
Throughout her post-interview, the interviewer challenged Dorothy to consider 
her position more critically, especially her tendency to agree with both Absolutism and 
Humanism as acceptable philosophies of mathematics.  For example, she wants math to 
always produce one right answer (Absolutism), but she also wants math to be personal, 
under the control of the person performing mathematics, and describes the evolution of 
mathematical knowledge in humanist terms.  She becomes aware that her position is 
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untenable, but this is not enough for her to change her position.  We believe this 
illustrates just how deeply seated her ideas about math are. 
When challenged further to defend her position, Dorothy’s sense of security, 
sourced in following rules, procedures, using formulas, and getting to the right answer, is 
threatened.  Throughout the interview, she repeatedly changes the topic, laughs, flirts, 
indicates she doesn’t care about the issues raised, and tries to brush off the interviewer.  
For example: 
Interviewer: So there is no interpretation or opinion in mathematics? 
Dorothy: No [laughs]. 
Interviewer: And yet you did talk about grayness coming into our philosophy of 
math? 
Dorothy: Ahhh okay [laughs]. 
Interviewer: Your turn. 
Dorothy:  Noooo [laughs] it shouldn’t be my turn! 
Given the frequency of these exchanges, we don’t believe these comments are random –  
Dorothy is profoundly uncomfortable.  At one point, she even makes a borderline 
inappropriate comment (i.e., “Men!”) which targets the interviewer.  We see this as 
additional evidence of her attempts to get out of the tight spot in which she finds herself.  
In addition, she sees the discussion itself as combative, even saying at one point to the 
interviewer “You win”.  The student is uncomfortable, defensive, and almost rude.  A 
process that she has found satisfying and which has fed her self-concept regarding 
mathematics, the process of targeting and then obtaining a right answer, is being seriously 
challenged, and she is seeking ways to bail out.  Her desire to avoid the issues altogether 
is closely connected to Dorothy’s need for control.  If the philosophy of math is 
integrated into her mathematical experience, she feels a loss of control, and literally 
doesn’t know what to do.  A huge source of her feelings of academic success becomes 
threatened, and her self-concept along with it.  She tries to avoid issues from the 
philosophy of mathematics to keep it separate from her experience of school math. 
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MARY  
 Based on the initial interview, Mary believes that she does well in math because she 
works hard.  She doesn’t believe she is good at mathematics, although she does enjoy 
doing mathematics and that enjoyment seems to be strongly tied to her experiences of 
success with math due to hard work.  Mary does what she is supposed to do in math class 
(and in all courses).  She accepts the knowledge of the instructor at face value and 
without question – the math that is taught in school was developed by mathematicians in 
the past and is true without question.  There is no need to question the results of 
mathematics.  Mary is happy with this state of affairs because it is easy to figure out what 
responses are correct, so that she can be successful in terms of grades and feel good about 
her hard work.  Mary perceives mathematical results as either right or wrong, which are 
sanctioned by teachers as the communicators of the work of mathematicians.  This is a 
tidy rendering of the nature of math because of the simple relationship between teachers 
and mathematicians and the unquestioned acceptance of the ultimate and universal truth 
of the mathematics learned in school.  For Mary, these beliefs about school math extend 
to all of mathematics. 
Mary’s conception of mathematics was challenged during the philosophy of 
mathematics unit.  We presented the idea that mathematics might not be absolute and that 
humans might be inextricably implicated with what is considered true in mathematics.  
Now, Mary must face the possibility that the canons of mathematics, which she is so 
successful at reproducing on math tests, might not be so certain.  She faces the possibility 
that the nature of mathematics involves uncertainty, which causes a problem for her 
desire to detect and reproduce right answers. 
 Mary adapts to the discomfort caused by epistemological messiness in two ways.  
First, she keeps mathematics at arm’s length.  For example, during the final interview, she 
said: 
I also agree with the fact that math has always existed and is not created by 
human beings or anyone else. When we, as humans, find out some new 
mathematical concept, we are really just discovering something that was always 
there. 
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This quote is representative of Mary’s position in two ways.  She rarely used “I” to state 
her position, and when she did, she reverted to “we” (which was much more common), as 
if to distance herself from the position.  Further, the quote represents Mary’s belief that 
math is ubiquitous – it is “everywhere.”  Mary deliberately places mathematics outside 
her personal experience, and the only reason she experiences math is because “we” 
cannot help bumping into it – it is needed for “us” to “survive.”  Keeping mathematics at 
arm’s length is comfortable for Mary.  It allows her to keep mathematics as objective and 
separate from us, which protects her comfortable acceptance of the absolutism of 
mathematics. 
 The second way Mary adapts to her discomfort during the unit is to be slow to 
commit to an answer or to sit on the fence.  For example, in the first journal she wrote:     
It can be argued whether math is independent and can act alone or if it needs 
language to exist. 
In the last journal, when asked to pick one of the four camps, she wrote:  
My philosophy of math is Platonism, as it is the philosophy of math that makes 
the most sense to me. I feel that there is not really one philosophy of math that is 
completely right.  
In the first quote, she states a contentious issue, but will not take a position.  In the 
second quote, she selects a position but makes a qualification.  Throughout the final 
interview, she was slow to answer, tried to give short and non-committal answers, and 
would qualify with phrases such as “I’m not sure.”  The only idea that Mary would 
commit to was that “we” can never be “sure.”  She uses uncertainty in general to protect 
her belief that mathematics can be certain.  She qualifies or doesn’t commit because she 
is looking for the school sanctioned right answer to reproduce.  The Theory of 
Knowledge course reinforced the idea that knowledge is never certain.  Mary is doing 
what school has taught her to do, namely, to reproduce the right answer. 
 When Mary does commit to a position it is because there is a strong emotional 
connection to her zone of comfort with mathematics.  In the final journal, when reflecting 
on whether school math has influenced her beliefs, she wrote:  
Although high school math has been a major influence on my beliefs of 
Platonism, I think my personal traits and the way in which I think also contribute 
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to my Platonist views. I like things that are black and white that give me definite 
answers. I do not want to be caught in a no man’s land, as I will not know what to 
do because I will not know what the right thing to do is.  Platonism tells me that 
concepts have definite answers. This is what makes me happy because I will 
know what I am doing, and can tell if I am doing the right thing. 
A Platonist view of mathematics is a security blanket for Mary.  During the final 
interview, when pressed on this issue, she admitted as much.  Formalism is rejected 
because math loses its real life ubiquitous nature (she is perhaps worried that formal math 
is so abstract that she will no longer be able to understand it) – this is the safety of 
keeping math at arm’s length.  Embodiment is rejected because math is not separate from 
humans, and so she cannot maintain an impersonal relationship with mathematics.  Proofs 
and Refutations is hedged by the possibility of finding absolute answers or the surety that 
“we” can never be sure.  These are strongly emotional positions, in the sense that she 
feels strongly about keeping mathematics impersonal and separate.  She selects Platonism 
because she feels strongly about wanting to feel happy about knowing there are right 
answers that she can correctly reproduce. 
JOHN 
John is extremely good at achieving 100% on math tests and exams.  He was also 
one of the few participants who expressed a genuine love of mathematics.  During his 
pre-interview, he stated, “I like the fact that in math you can derive an answer and be 
certain of it…”  He admires the work of mathematicians, and feels a sense of pleasure 
when his ability to be the only one in a math class who can solve a challenging problem 
positions him as the “mathematician” of the class.  A key word used in his pre-interview 
is “comfortable.”  He likes math because it makes him feel comfortable.  He knows what 
to do, he’s good at doing it, and he experiences satisfaction at the achievement of the one, 
unique answer.  Math is at the center of his self-concept; he in fact claims it to be at the 
center of “everything.”  John has simplified the nature of mathematics by conflating what 
he does in school math with the work of a mathematician.  He sees himself as a problem 
solver, and his success on math tests props up this perception of mathematics – he is 
comfortable with his perceptions.  His comfort with school math generates a blind spot in 
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recognizing the potential differences between how math is rendered in school and how 
mathematicians experience mathematics. 
 During the philosophy of math unit, John’s discomfort was minimal at first but 
slowly increased.  After the first class he wrote:  “I think about math today in another 
light, one in which I am not used to thinking.”  John is just a little bit worried because the 
first class has triggered the thought that the math he is comfortable with might not be the 
math of mathematicians.  In subsequent journals, we find evidence of an increase in his 
concerns about mathematics.  Later in the unit he wrote: 
I learned about the idea of embodiment today.  I, however, don’t buy it.  I believe 
that we, as humans, despite our given restrictions within the reality by which we 
live, are capable of extrapolating our knowledge into areas and dimensions 
unprovable by our current capabilities.  I still believe firmly in absolutism. 
The words “however” in sentence two and “firmly” in the last sentence are not needed by 
John to express his ideas.  Their presence suggests how important John felt it was to 
emphasize his position, and hence his increasing concern with the ideas presented.   
 Part of his discomfort is rooted in his respect for mathematics and 
mathematicians.  During class discussions, we learned that John read about 
mathematicians and mathematics out of interest (not as required school reading).  In one 
of his journals he wrote:  “We have a problem.  And a mathematician must [emphasis not 
added] be able to accept it.”  He admires mathematicians, but is discovering an element 
of being a mathematician that is outside his comfort zone.  His discomfort with the ideas 
presented during class activities has increased.  We believe this is because he has 
available to him increasing evidence that the mathematics he is comfortable with is not so 
neat and tidy.  The one right answer he is certain exists for every problem and takes 
pleasure in finding has been challenged. 
John also values critical thinking – he is curious about ideas but is also skeptical.  
We found this evident in his questioning and challenging disposition during class 
discussions.  We also found this evident in journal entries.  For example, from two of his 
journals: 
I feel that this is an extremely deep topic, in need of further explanation, and look 
forward to further exploring it. 
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And: 
There are always abstract exceptions to mathematics.  It is indeed fascinating to 
wonder about it and analyze, realizing we might never truly achieve an answer.  It 
is rather the thought process that makes it all worthwhile. 
John values thinking for the sake of thinking.  John believes that an idea must stand up to 
critique before it is accepted, and he wants to engage in such critical thought processes.  
He finds pleasure in engaging with ideas.  Thus, when he found his ideas about 
mathematics to be challenged, he took this challenge seriously because he values critical 
thinking.   
He must find a way to navigate the disruption in his comfort with the math he has 
experienced in school.  He does this, with pleasure, through critical thinking.  Although 
he adamantly agreed with Absolutism, through his skeptical challenging and questioning, 
he eventually found problems with both Platonism and Formalism.  His initial reactions 
to both Proofs/Refutations and Embodiment was rejection because they represented a 
rejection of Absolutism.  Now his skeptical disposition was to question and critique in 
order to find reasons to also reject these positions.  But Embodiment, in his perception, 
was difficult to reject.  We spoke several times after class about Embodiment – it was 
clear that his valuing of pure thinking was the essence of his curiosity and questioning.  
He wanted to make sure he understood in order to make sure the ideas could withstand 
critical evaluation.  So, although he rejected Embodiment in his second last journal, his 
last journal started to describe a philosophy of math that he labeled “Embodied 
Absolutism.”  John is finding a way to protect his absolute vision of and experience with 
mathematics through his pure joy with pure thinking. 
During the final interview, John’s explication of his ideas continued, predicated 
on his joy of engaging with ideas.  He sees Embodied Absolutism as a philosophical 
project – a thought experiment – in which the problem is deciding what is absolute and 
what is embodied.  For example, John argued that although error may arise due to 
perception, and this is because of our embodiment, the concept that is perceived is still 
absolute.  When challenged on this idea, he acknowledged that he might be wrong about 
“where Absolutism stops and embodiment starts.”  His post interview is singularly 
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focused on his recognition that there is still thinking to be done on his philosophy, and he 
is willing and happy to do that thinking. 
John’s comfort/pleasure with math is inextricably tied up with his 
comfort/pleasure with thinking, where the thinking he values is oriented by both curiosity 
about pure thought and by skepticism of all ideas.  But absolutism is the one idea, at least 
at the ontological level, which cannot be challenged – there must be some absolutes.  For 
example, he noted that the “…fact that we are embodied…is absolute.”  At the beginning 
of the post-interview, he described the ideas as fascinating (a word used several times in 
his journal as well).  The philosophy of math has been a cerebral game, but he loves 
playing this kind of thinking game, and so his comfort with thinking about ideas “for the 
fun of it” protects him from the disruption of his comfort with school math.  School math 
becomes compartmentalized – his experiences with school math remain separate and 
protected from his thinking about the nature of mathematics. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, Dorothy starts from her comfort with the absolutism of mathematics, 
and then the messiness of philosophy of mathematics disrupts this comfort.  To deal with 
this discomfort, she seeks simplistic answers.  For example, she tries to simultaneously 
agree and disagree with a Humanist position.  She tries to avoid philosophy of 
mathematics issues altogether.  Epistemological messiness thwarts what she really likes 
about math, what she describes as its lack of “greyness.”  Dorothy experiences profound 
discomfort, and to protect her sense of identity in relation to mathematics, she 
compartmentalizes philosophy of mathematics to keep it separate from her experiences 
with school math. 
Mary wants to maintain her identity with mathematics as an objective and 
separate body of knowledge with which she need not think or feel personally about.  
When the ubiquitous, objective and absolute mathematics that she is happy with (because 
she can successfully reproduce it for her teachers) is challenged, she feels discomfort.  
She does not want to face the prospect that a nature of mathematics, which she is happy 
with, might not be representative of mathematics.  She protects her sense of identity by 
being non-committal, qualifying her answers, or keeping ideas at arm’s length from her 
personal beliefs.  This allows her to maintain a sense of success – if she doesn’t commit, 
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she doesn’t need to face being wrong.  When she does commit, it is to maintain and 
protect a strong emotional connection to mathematics – that is, that she is happy with 
math and that would allow her to maintain an impersonal relationship with math.   
John genuinely loves mathematics and pure thinking and these are intricately tied 
together.  But it is skepticism that ultimately protects his identity in relation to 
mathematics.  Although his comfort with school math is disrupted, he is critical of all 
ideas except the idea that there must be some absolutes.  That there must be some 
absolutes and his joy of pure thinking leads him to synthesize absolutism with 
embodiment.  This allows him to ultimately protect his identity in relation to school math 
because, in the end, it is pure thought that matters and is valued.  Mathematics is based on 
pure thought.  Descartes would be proud. 
We would like to highlight several features of these three stories of navigating of 
disruption.  First, a story of identity in relation to mathematics is intrinsically and 
fundamentally bound up with a story of identity in general.  Dorothy’s outgoing nature 
was the story of her sense of indecision in terms of the philosophies of mathematics that 
we presented.  Mary’s quietness is her way of seeking the answer that she will quietly 
embrace and, given the opportunity, reproduce on tests if her answer is the curriculum-
sanctioned correct answer.  John’s skepticism is fundamental to both his continued 
rejection of ideas but also his eventual acknowledgement of the skepticism of the 
Embodiment position. 
Second, we believe that these students compartmentalize their disruption.  The 
Theory of Knowledge (ToK) course is a mental game.  For Dorothy, the game doesn’t 
really matter.  For Mary, she quietly plays the game by looking for the sanctioned right 
answer, which is absolute in math class and “there is no right answer” in ToK.  John 
enjoys playing the mental game of debating ideas, but when in math class, he understands 
the procedure presented and gets mad at himself when he makes a “stupid” mistake on a 
test – the skepticism of TofK does not carry over into math class.  We believe this 
compartmentalizing is important for maintaining a sense of coherent identity in relation 
to mathematics for these students.  If they did not compartmentalize their experience of 
our messy philosophy of mathematics unit, their experience outside the unit would also 
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be disrupted, which could potentially undermine their status as the “smart” (math) 
students as sanctioned by their teachers 
From the results of this project, we make several recommendations.  It may seem 
that our philosophy of mathematics unit failed to enrich these gifted student’s beliefs 
concerning the nature of mathematics – their beliefs were only disrupted leading to a 
compartmentalization of school math and philosophy of mathematics.  But our 
philosophy of mathematics unit was only a two-week intervention compared to 12 years 
of enculturation into a narrow and tidy vision of math.  These gifted students are focused 
on maintaining their success (read grades) in the IB program.  In particular, their IB 
mathematics teacher was resistant to the ideas explored in our unit, so the “geography” of 
the school math course and ToK course may have contributed to the 
compartmentalization we observed.  Given the social milieu of our project, perhaps 
mathematics as messy is too foreign for these gifted students to occasion change in their 
relationship with or perceptions of mathematics.  Other renderings of mathematics could 
be used to enrich our messy framing of the nature of mathematics, such as by Byers 
(2007), who uses concepts such as mystery and ambiguity to describe key processes in 
the development of mathematical ideas.  It may be that activities can be created based on 
mystery/ambiguity that resonate, rather than disrupt, while still occasioning richer 
conceptions of mathematics among these gifted students. 
We also believe that the disruption and compartmentalization experienced by 
these gifted students is a curricular issue.  All mathematics curricula, to our knowledge, 
state a major goal is for students to appreciate the products and processes of mathematics.  
And yet, a richer exploration of the nature of mathematics with gifted high school 
students is disruptive of their personal identity in relation to mathematics.  This is 
because mathematics curriculum, as enacted in math classrooms, is singularly narrow in 
its tidy vision of mathematics.  Most curricula try to point to the richness of mathematics 
through a list of mathematical processes (e.g., problem solving, reasoning) that should be 
infused throughout the teaching of all skills and concepts.  But this list is easily framed 
by a narrow vision of mathematics.  We believe that curriculum documents should 
endorse a “critical engagement” mathematical process, which signals teachers concerning 
some of the messiness of mathematics.  The goal would be opportunities for students to 
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experience some of the messiness of mathematics as regularly as problem solving and 
throughout their K-12 school math program.  A critical engagement mathematical process 
could be enacted throughout K-12, so that children/teachers are not 
enculturated/enculturating a narrow and tidy vision of mathematics. 
The curricular recommendations above have significant implications for teacher 
professional learning.  The expansion of mathematics curriculum to include messiness 
places considerable demands on all K-12 teachers, especially given the common belief 
among teachers and wider society that the nature of mathematics is uncontested and 
uncontestable.  The professional learning of teachers is a significant concern because it 
effects all kinds and levels of teacher education, at a time when it is not clear how to 
effectively invite teachers into the current agenda (e.g., National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics, 2000) to reform mathematics education; and because current calls for 
reform are effectively silent concerning philosophically-based goals or learning 
outcomes, so are insufficient based on our curricular recommendations.  We consider 
these implications as a call for collective and action-based research that raises the status 
of philosophy of mathematics among all educational stakeholders. 
Finally, this project raises questions for further research.  Our research questions 
for this initial project were exploratory in nature and focused on gifted students.  
Subsequent research could consider more closely how student identity is related to 
student relationships with mathematics.  For example, what is the relationship between 
expanded or disrupted perceptions of the nature of mathematics and success in school 
math?  Would gifted abilities contribute to or hinder a student’s responsiveness to issues 
concerning the nature of mathematics?  More precise research questions are needed to 
expand the literature, and subsequent research could consider the general student 
population as compared to gifted students. 
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